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"alternative type of promotional service or facility which is of equivalent
measurable cost ' 26 may be substituted in its place.
It could be argued with some merit that the same type of policy rules
should apply to other industries inasmuch as their problems, in part,
are not unlike those in the Cosmetic Industry.
Although the Commission and the courts have indirectly approved
only one interpretation of the phrase "proportionally equal terms," this
is by no means the only ratio that would be valid under the Act. The
real hope of the phrase lies not in its ambiguous past nor its equally
uncertain present but in future liberal constructions which the judicial
and administrative bodies must, of necessity, place upon it.
EDWIN S. PRESTON, JR.
Criminal Law-Former jeopardy-Discharge of jury Held to
Bar Subsequent Prosecution
Defendant was on trial for murder. At the end of the third day of
the trial the jurors were taken to a local hotel for the night. During the
night, the police, upon being called to investigate the conduct of the
jurors, found three in an intoxicated condition. When court was con-
vened the next day, in the absence of the jury and upon the testimony
of the officers, the judge withdrew a juror and declared a mistrial. The
defendant objected to the order of mistrial, and upon the court's over-
ruling the objection, duly excepted. At a later trial the defendant was
convicted of manslaughter, the court overruling a plea of former jeop-
ardy, to which the defendant duly excepted. On appeal, the Supreme
Court in a unanimous decision vacated the judgment, held the order of
mistrial improper and sustained the defendant's plea of former jeopardy1
The principle that a person shall not be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense is deeply rooted in American jurisprudence. 2 It is well
established that jeopardy attaches when a competent jury is sworn
"8 See note 23, supra.
State v. Crocker, 239 N. C. 446, 80 S. E. 2d 243 (1954). The city police
officers testified that they observed three jurors moving along the halls of the hotel
in an intoxicated condition. The sheriff testified that he observed one of the jurors
in an intoxicated condition either from alcoholic beverages or narcotic drugs, and
had to threaten arrest before the juror would become quiet and re-enter his room.
2 The Federal Constitution and all of the state constitutions, except the Consti-
tutions of Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Vermont,
contain prohibitions against double jeopardy. The states that do not have a con-
stitutional provision have the principle as a part of their common law. State v.
Benham, 7 Conn. 414 (1829) ; Gilpin v. State, 142 Md. 464, 121 Atl. 354 (1923) ;
Commonwealth v. McCan, 277 Mass. 199, 178 N. E. 633 (1931) ; State v. Clem-
mons, 207 N. C. 276, 176 S. E. 760 (1934) ; State v. O'Brien, 106 Vt. 97, 170 Atl.
98 (1934). See A. I. L., Administration of the Criminal Law, Commentary to § 6




and impaneled to try the case.3  If the discharge of the jury and the
declaration of a mistrial is at the instance or with the consent of the
defendant, this constitutes a waiver, and he cannot later maintain a plea
of former jeopardy.4
Early decisions gave the courts little authority to discharge the jury
and declare a mistrial for any cause, without prejudicing the state's right
to proceed again.5  However, the strict rule of those decisions has been
greatly relaxed and the present-day rule is that a trial judge may dis-
charge a jury and declare a mistrial without working an acquittal of
the defendant when there is a manifest necessity or when justice would
be better served under the circumstances. 6 North Carolina classifies
the types of necessity warranting the discharge of the jury into two
kinds: "physical necessity" and the "necessity of doing justice." Ne-
cessity for a mistrial arising from misconduct of one or more of the jurors
might well fall into either class.
8
The impossibility of defining all of the circumstances under which
Westover v. State, 66 Ariz. 145, 185 P. 2d 315 (1947) ; State ex rel. Larkins
v. Lewis, 54 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1951) ; State v. Hutter, 145 Neb. 798, 18 N. W. 2d 203
(1945) ; State v. Bell, 205 N. C. 225, 171 S. E. 50 (1933) ; 22 C. J. S., Criminal
Law § 241 n. 64 (1940).
'Barrett v. Bigger, 57 App. D. C. 81, 17 F. 2d 669 (1927), cert. denied, 274
U. S. 752 (1927) ; Westover v. State, 66 Ariz. 145, 185 P. 2d 315 (1947) ; People
v. Agnew, 77 Cal. App. 2d 748, 176 P. 2d 724 (1947), cert. denied, 337 U. S. 909
(1949), rehearing denied, 337 U. S. 927 (1949), rehearing again denied, 338 U. S.
842 (1949) ; Kamen v. Gray, 169 Kan. 664, 220 P. 2d 160 (1950), cert. denied, 340
U. S. 890 (1950) ; State v. Dry, 152 N. C. 813, 67 S. E. 1000 (1910) ; Etter v.
State, 185 Tenn. 218, 205 S. W. 2d 1 (1947) ; Chamberlain v. State, 146 Tex. Cr.
R. 300, 174 S. W. 2d 604 (1943).
Atkins v. State, 16 Ark. 568 (1855) (urgent necessity) ; McCorkle v. State,
14 Ind. 39 (1859) (imperious necessity) ; State v. Bass, 82 N. C. 570 (1880)
(great necessity) ; State v. Ephraim, 19 N. C. 162 (1836) (evident, urgent, over-
ruling necessity arising from matters beyond humnan foresight and control). The
Supreme Court of the United States had earlier indicated a relaxation of the rule,
in holding that a mistrial could be proper where the ends of justice would other-
%vise be defeated. United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 (U. S. 1824).
' "We think, that in cases of this nature, the law has invested courts of justice
to discharge the jury from giving any verdict, whenever in their opinion, taking
all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act,
or the ends of justice would otherwise be defeated." United States v. Perez, 9
Wheat. 579, 580 (U. S. 1824) ; accord, Maddox v. State, 230 Ind. 92, 102 N. E. 2d
225 (1951); Baker v. Commonwealth, 280 Ky. 165, 132 S. W. 2d 766 (1939);
Ex parte Earle, 316 Mich. 295, 25 N. W. 2d 202 (1946) ; State v. Bowman, 231
N. C. 51, 55 S. E. 2d 789 (1949) ; State v. Beal, 199 N. C. 278, 154 S. E. 604
(1930) ; State v. Cain, 175 N. C. 825, 95 S. E. 930 (1918) ; State v. Upton, 170
N. C. 769, 87 S. E. 328 (1915) ; State v. Tyson, 138 N. C. 627, 628, 50 S. E. 456
(1905) ("It is well settled and admits of no controversy that in all cases, capital
included, the court may discharge a jury and order a mistrial when it is necessary
to attain the ends of justice.") ; Yarborough v. State, 90 Okla. Cr. R 74, 210 P. 2d
375 (1949) ; State v. Brunn, 22 Wash. 2d 120, 154 P. 2d 826 (1945).
' State v. Beal, 199 N. C. 278, 154 S. E. 604 (1930) ; State v. Tyson, 138 N. C.
627, 50 S. E. 456 (1905) ; State v. Bell, 81 N. C. 591 (1879); State v. Wiseman,
68 N. C. 203 (1873).
8 See State v. Tyson, 138 N. C. 627, 50 S. E. 456 (1905) (juror, because in-
toxicated, was physically unfit to continue: too, the ends of justice would be de-
feated if he were allowed to serve).
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a discharge of the jury and an order of mistrial would be proper requires
that this power rest in the sound discretion of the trial judge.0 It is
generally held that the discharge of the jury will not be reviewed unless
there is a clear abuse of this discretion. 10  A few jurisdictions," in-
cluding North Carolina, 12 require the trial judge to find the facts upon
which the order was based and set them out in the record in order that
they may be reviewed by the appellate court upon the application of the
defendant. In North Carolina, however, the finding of fact is required,
and review of an order of mistrial allowed, only in capital felonies.18
Hence a plea of former jeopardy is not available in misdemeanors and
non-capital felonies in the absence of a showing of "gross" abuse 14 of
discretion, since it is a non-reviewable matter resting in the discretion,
of the trial court.15
"Simmons v. United States, 142 U. S. 148 (1891); United States v. Perez, 9
Wheat. 579, 580 (U. S. 1824) ("They [trial courts] are to exercise a sound dis-
cretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all the circumstances which
would render it proper to interfere.") ; It re Ascher, 130 Mich. 540, 90 N. W. 418
(1902) ; State v. Bowman, 231 N. C. 51, 55, S. E. 2d 789 (1949) ; State v. Beal
199 N. C. 278, 154 S. E. 604 (1930) ; State v. Tyson, 138 N. C. 627, 50 S. E. 453
(1905) ; State v. Wiseman, 68 N. C. 203 (1873) ; State v. Barnes, 54 Wash. 493,
103 Pac. 792 (1909). But cf. In re Spier, 12 N. C. 491 (1828) and State v.
Garriques, 2 N. C. 241 (1795) where the discretionary power of the trial judge
was denied.
'0 United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 580 (U. S. 1824) ("But, after all,
they [trial courts] have the right to order the discharge; and the security which
the public have for faithful, sound and conscientious exercise of this discretion,
rests, in this, as in other cases, upon the responsibility of the judges, under their
oaths of office.") ; Andrews v. State, 174 Ala. 11, 56 So. 998 (1911) ; People v.
Simos, 345 Ill. 226, 178 N. E. 188 (1931) ; Ex parte Earle, 316 Mich. 295, 25 N. W.
2d 202 (1946) ; State v. Barnes, 54 Wash. 493, 103 Pac. 792 (1909).
11 State v. Leunig, 42 Ind. 541 (1873) ; State v. Klauer, 70 Kan. 383, 78 Pac.
802 (1904); People v. Parker, 145 Mich. 488, 108 N. W. 999 (1906); State v.
Conklin, 25 Neb. 784, 41 N. W. 788 (1889) ; Yarborough v. State, 90 Okla. Cr. R.
74, 210 P. 2d 375 (1949) ; State v. Bilton, 156 S. C. 324, 153 S. E. 269 (1930);
State v. Whitman, 93 Utah 557, 74 P. 2d 696 (1937).
" Finding of facts and setting them out in the record is emphasized in the North
Carolina cases. See State v. Beal, 199 N. C. 278, 154 S. E. 604 (1930) ; State v.
Cain, 175 N. C. 825, 95 S. E. 930 (1918) ; State v. Tyson, 138 N. C. 627, 50 S. E.
456 (1905) ; State v. Bailey, 65 N. C. 426 (1871).
State v. Dove, 222 N. C. 162, 22 S. E. 2d 231 (1942) ; State v. Beal, 199 N. C.
278, 154 S. E. 604 (1930) ; State v. Tyson, 138 N. C. 627, 50 S. E. 456 (1905).
This rule seems peculiar to North Carolina. But cf. State v. Bailey, 65 N. C. 426,
428 (1871) ("In inferior misdemeanors, such as assaults, batteries, forcible trespass
and the like, the Judges have a discretionary power to order mistrials, and in such
cases their decisions cannot be reviewed by this Court, but even here mistrials
should not be granted for slight causes. But in capital felonies, and in felonies
not capital, and in misdemeanors where infamous punishments may be inflicted, as
in perjury, conspiracy, and the like, the decisions of the Judges in the Court below
may be reviewed in this Court. In such cases the Judges should find the facts,
which this Court cannot review; but the law ,bearing upon the facts thus found
are the subject of review in this Court by an appeal after the final decision in the
Court below.").
"State v. Andrews, 166 N. C. 349, 81 S. E. 416 (1914).
15 State v. Guice, 201 N. C. 761, 161 S. E. 533 (1931); State v. Ellis, 200 N. C.
77, 156 S. E. 157 (1930) ; State v. Upton, 170 N. C. 769, 87 S. E. 328 (1915) ;




If the jury is discharged over the objection of the defendant, and
on review it is determined that the surrounding circumstances and facts
did not in fact necessitate an order of mistrial, the reasons for the action
being legally insufficient, the plea of former jeopardy will be allowed.1 6
No definite rule can be formulated which will encompass all of the
different types of misconduct which will be declared to be legally suffi-
cient to support an order of mistrial. Each case must rest on its own
surrounding facts and circumstances.1 7  However, a juror's misconduct
on voir dire examination has been held to be misconduct sufficient to
sustain the withdrawal of a juror more often, perhaps, than any other
type of juror misconduct. Thus, in cases where a juror has falsely
sworn that he was not acquainted with the defendant ;1s withheld the fact
that he was friendly' 9 or partial20 to the defendant; concealed other
facts ;21 revealed that he had not told the truth concerning his scruples
as to conviction on circumstantial evidence ;22 and where he has fraudu-
lently gained access to the jury for the purpose of acquitting the de-
fendant,23 the withdrawal of a juror and the declaration of a mistrial
over the defendant's objection has been sustained.
Other types of misconduct by members of the jury which have been
held sufficient to sustaifi the withdrawal of a juror and the declaration
of a mistrial include: a juror's becoming separated from the other mem-
bers of the jury ;24 intoxication of a juror during trial25 and during
recess ;26 a juror's procuring liquor for other jurors ;27 a juror's asso-
" State ex rel. Manning v. Hines, 153 Fla. 711, 15 So. 2d 613 (1943) ; Jordan v.
State, 75 Ga. App. 815, 44 S. E. 2d 821 (1947) ; Maddox v. State, 230 Ind. 92, 102
N. E. 2d 225 (1951) ; Kamen v. Gray, 169 Kan. 664, 220 P. 2d 160 (1950), cert.
denied, 340 U. S. 890 (1950) ; Mullins v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 529, 80 S. E. 2d
606 (1935) ; State v. Prince, 63 N. C. 529 (1869).
"' For a collection of cases and situations where the jury was discharged over
the defendant's objection, see, WHARTON, CRimiNAL LAW, Vol. I, § 394 (1912).
"- Simmons v. United States, 142 U. S. 148 (1891).
" Helton v. State, 255 S. E. 2d 694 (Tenn. 1953).
20 Quinton v. State, 112 Neb. 684, 112 N. W. 881 (1924).
In  re Ascher, 130 Mich. 540, 90 N. W. 418 (1902).
" State v. Cain, 175 N. C. 825, 95 S. E.. 930 (1918).
" State v. Washington, 89 N. C. 535 (1883) (without defendant's knowledge);
State v. Bell, 81 N. C. 591 (1879) (at the instance of the defendant).
2 Etter v. State, 185 Tenn. 218, 205 S. W. 2d 1 (1947).
" In re Ascher, 130 Mich. 540, 90 N. W. 418 (1902) ; State v. Tyson, 138 N. C.
627, 50 S. E. 456 (1905) (upon examining the juror, judge found him to be in a
"nervous and besottled condition" and unfit to continue).
"0 Fetty v. State, 119 Neb. 619, 230 N. W. 440 (1930) (juror found unfit for
duty after being jailed for public drunkenness) ; State v. Tyson, 138 N. C. 627, 50
S. E. 456 (1905) (juror drank before the trial, during the trial, and during recess).
For a note concerning drunkenness of jurors and subsequent mistrials, see 9 NEB.
L. BULL. 215 (1930).
2" li re Ascher, 130 Mich. 540, 90 N. W. 418 (1902). This is an extreme ex-
ample of misconduct on the part of the jurors; they concealed facts on voir dire
examination, made statements showing prejudice, got the bailiff intoxicated, pro-
cured liquor for others, drank, and were found guilty of unauthorized communi-
cations.
19541
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ciation with an interested person ;28 and a juror's public statements
indicating his unfitness for duty after he had been impaneled.20 Con-
versely, where the bailiff bought beer at defendant's saloon which he
gave to the members of the jury ;30 or where the foreman spoke briefly
to the complaining witness ;31 and where a juror during a recess wan-
dered away from the custody of the officer in charge and visited a nearby
restaurant, 2 it has been held that the surrounding facts and circum-
stances did not constitute sufficient misconduct to sustain an order of
mistrial over the defendant's objection.
In the light of the former jeopardy provisions of our constitutions and
decisions,33 it is obvious that extreme caution should be used in ordering
discharge of a jury for alleged misconduct of one or more of its mem-
bers. A mistrial should be ordered only under urgent circumstances,
and especially in capital cases, only after a plain and obvious cause has
been shown to exist.3 4 When the misconduct of the juror or jurors
occurs outside the courtroom and not in the presence of the judge, a
competent judicial inquiry is necessary to determine the existence of a
necessity for a mistrial.3 5
Thus, where mere convenience is concerned, or where the conduct
is an irregularity only, and where the trial judge does not properly
investigate the surrounding circumstances, it is error to withdraw a
juror and declare a mistrial and a plea of former jeopardy should be
sustained.3 6
" People v. Bigg, 237 Mich. 58, 297 N. W. 70 (1941) ; People v. Diamond, 231
Mich. 484, 204 N. W. 105 (1925).
21 People v. Schepps, 231 Mich. 260, 203 N. W. 882 (1925) (juror stated pub-
licly that he thought confining the jurors reflected on his honor and thereby
prejudiced him against the state); People v. Sharp, 163 Mich. 79, 127 N. W. 758
(1910) ("When I am on a jury and I get my mind made up, by - , it will take
more than they have got to change it.") ; State v. Rector, 166 S. C. 335, 164 S. E.
865 (1931) (juror's statement that he would disregard incriminating testimony
because the witness was a Negro).
"o State v. Leunig, 42 Ind. 541 (1873) (jurors were taken by the bailiff, con-
trary to the orders of the court, to the public square, where he left them, and
procured beer for them from defendant's saloon. The judge ordered a discharge
of the jury, but on appeal this was reversed, the facts presenting no necessity for
such discharge).
"People v. Fishman, 64 N. Y. Misc. 256, 119 N. Y. Supp. 89 (Gen. Sess.
1909).
' 2 Mullins v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 529, 80 S. W. 2d 606 (1935).
:s See note 2 supra.
.' United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 (U. S. 1824) ; In re Ascher, 130 Mich.
540, 90 N. W. 418 (1902) ; State v. Barnes, 54 Wash. 493, 103 Pac. 792 (1909).
"State v. Hansford, 76 Kan. 678, 92 Pac. 551 (1907) ; Salistean v. State, 115
Neb. 838, 215 N. W. 107 (1927); State v. Jefferson, 66 N. C. 309 (1872); Up-
church v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 627, 38 S. W. 206 (1896).
"' See notes 25-27 supra; State v. Crocker, 239 N. C. 446, 80 S. E. 2d 243
(1954) ("Nor is there evidence that any of these jurors, when court convened
Friday morning, were not 'clothed in their right minds' and able to proceed with
their jury service. The record here shows that the testimony before the trial judge
was heard in the absence of the jury. There is no indication that any of the jurors
were questioned in open court or examined by a physician or other person relative
[Vol. 32
NOTES AND COMMENT
When, after a thorough examination by the trial judge as to the
facts and circumstances surrounding the misconduct of the jury, he finds
that justice would be better served if the jury were discharged, the gen-
eral rule is that such a decision will not be disturbed on appeal, and on
subsequent retrial, double jeopardy will not attach.37
In view of the constitutional and common law prohibitions against
double jeopardy, and consistent with the basic theory that such mistrial
is to be used only in cases of manifest necessity, it is submitted that the
decision in the instant case is sound.
38
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Civil Procedure-Consent Judgments and Settlements-Right of
Liability Insurer to Bind Insured
The North Carolina motorist who reads his liability policy carefully
will probably notice that it contains a clause substantially as follows:
The Company shall (a) defend any suit against the insured al-
leging such injury, sickness, disease, or destruction and seeking
damages on account thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false,
or fraudulent; But the Company may make such investigation,
negotiation, and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems ex-
pedient.1 (Italics added.)
The usual policy also includes an express condition precedent to the
insurer's obligation to indemnify the insured which requires him to for-
ward immediately to the insurer any process, demand, notice, or pleading
served on him because of an accident in which the insured was involved.
2
to their fitness and competence to serve as jurors when court convened on Friday
morning.") [Italics added.]
" See notes 18-24 supra. In the majority of cases in which a mistrial has been
sustained over defendant's objection, the trial judge has personally examined the
jurors to determine the necessity for a discharge of the jury.
" State v. Crocker, 239 N. C. 446, 453, 80 S. E. 2d 243 (1954). "Our holding
here is that the facts and circumstances set forth in the findings of fact are not of
such compelling nature as to justify a further relaxation of a rule of such import-
ance in safeguarding the life and liberty of a citizen against repeated prosecutions
for the same offense. The preservation of the salutary principle underlying the plea
of former jeopardy in capital cases is of far greater importance than the service by
this defendant of the prison term imposed by the judgment . . . upon her conviction
for manslaughter."
'Because of this wording the standard indemnity policy is more than a mere
contract of indemnity against actual loss in the sense of money paid. It is a con-
tract of insurance against liability for damages, and the insurer adopts the liability
of the insured, within policy coverage. State ex rel. Boney v. Central Mutual Ins.
Co. of Chicago, 213 N. C. 470, 196 S. E. 837 (1938).
If the plaintiff and the defendant are both insured by the same company, the
insureds must engage their own attorneys, and the policies become mere indemnity
policies. O'Morrow v. Borad, 27 Cal. 2d 794, 167 P. 2d 483 (1946).
'Hendrix v. Employer's Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 102 F. Supp. 31 (E. D. S. C.
1952) ; Martin v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 258 S. W. 2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App.
1953). See Stephens v. Childers, 236 N. C. 348, 72 S. E. 2d 849 (1952).
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